Monday, August 11, 2014

Hobby Lobby - yes AGAIN!!

Much has been written about the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision since June but I cannot get it out of my mind. The aspect of that issue that I want to focus on here is that of responsibility. Policy-making will remain inconsistent at best and partisan at worst unless we decide what makes us (as individuals and corporations) responsible for an action.

Clearly, the case shows that Hobby Lobby and the Conestoga Wood Company felt responsible in some way for employees obtaining and using abortifacients (drugs which induce abortions). Though scientists have disproven the idea that these drugs “cause” abortions in any direct way, this is bound up in the religious beliefs of the people that own these companies. They oppose these drugs on religious grounds and therefore, do not want to facilitate their use in any way. But how, by merely providing healthcare, can a person/family/company be complicit in another person’s decision to use abortifacients? The company was providing healthcare which then subsidized the purchase of these drugs. They were not advocating or acquiescing to the use of these drugs. To the owners of these companies, subsidizing such a purchase apparently makes you responsible for the action itself. Paying for a plan which then subsidizes an abortifacient led to a feeling of responsibility for such a purchase. In other words, these companies felt that if they allowed their healthcare plan to subsidize these medications, and women, therefore, got easier access to them, this was making the company responsible for the subsequent “abortions”. However, this is an indirect responsibility at best and indulging in this type of reasoning, opens a Pandora’s box of questions. Where then does indirect responsibility end? If a woman works at Hobby Lobby, is paid by Hobby Lobby, and then uses that salary to obtain the drugs, is Hobby Lobby responsible? By paying the “high” salary that we keep hearing about, are they not responsible for women who work for them and can afford to buy these medications? Can companies be held responsible for things they “facilitate” in the same indirect way? Can I hold a company responsible if I gain weight by overeating their delicious food? The only way for companies like Hobby Lobby to ensure that they are not complicit in any way, direct or indirect, for women purchasing abortifacients is by hiring only men, or making sure that the women that work there believe in the same principles that they do. Obviously this solution is neither desirable nor possible nor legal.

This brings me to the connection between Hobby Lobby and China. As article after article has pointed out, Hobby Lobby’s religious beliefs do not seem to be violated by their dealings with a country which has a large number of human rights violations and a (now a little mitigated) one-child policy. Here, again, the question of responsibility is paramount. If subsidizing a healthcare plan, which may or may not lead to purchase of abortifacients, is wrong, why is the same not true for subsidizing a government which forces these decisions on its people? John Locke famously expounds on what he calls “tacit consent” in his Second Treatise of Government. Tacit consent is given through passive use/acceptance/interaction with a government. Thus, even if you are travelling the highway in a country, you are seen to have given consent to its laws. In other words, any association with a government which is not rebellious is seen as giving tacit consent to it. Certainly, given the indirect responsibility that these companies seem to take on themselves for women’s healthcare decisions, they can be seen as having given tacit consent to the countries they do business with. Thus, the accusation of hypocrisy against Hobby Lobby seems accurate.

Of course, the easy answer to this philosophical objection is that religious beliefs are not based on reason. Since Hobby Lobby’s beliefs are based on religion, they do not have to be consistent. This is Justice Alito’s answer in his decision where he makes the point that there simply cannot be a national direct answer to the question of who is responsible for indirect actions due to vast diversity on this issue. The problem is that, while religious belief does not have to be based on reason, public policy does. This is precisely why basing public policy on religious beliefs is a mistake. Public policies reflect (at least a belief about) a chain of causation. Every policy which is passed says something about what we believe and what we want. However, public policy also has to be general and applicable to all. To accept indirect responsibility on the basis of faith is to discard the possibility of a rational, consistent, coherent public policy to the wild vicissitudes of belief and self-interest of all.


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